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Abstract 
The dairy sector is mostly concerned with market volatility and with the transforma-
tions of European regulations. In September, 2009, more than 60,000 European dairy 
farmers halted or reduced milk deliveries to protest falling prices and the European 
Commission’s plans to scrap production quotas. The strike was initiated by the Euro-
pean Milk Board (EMB), a new European association of milk producers’ associations 
and unions, promoting an alternative discourse on the European and national regu-
lations of the dairy sector. In France, among the highest rates of strikers were to be 
found in the Basque Country. This paper argues that the 2009 milk strike testifies the 
emergence of a new kind of protest, being simultaneously transnational and local. In 
the Basque case, the milk strike sheds light on two dimensions. First, the strike informs 
on the local perception of the Common agricultural policy and of European integra-
tion. Second, the strike challenged the traditional equilibrium between the two local 
farmers’ unions (FDSEA and ELB-Confédération paysanne) by the birth of a new 
specialised association, the APLI (Association de producteurs de lait indépendants), 
related to the EMB. The protest gave birth to a public controversy where European and 
territorial issues appeared to be intrinsically interdependent.
 Résumé
Le secteur bovin-lait est soumis à la fois à la volatilité des marchés et aux muta-
tions des régulations européennes. En septembre 2009, plus de 60.000 producteurs 
laitiers européens interrompent ou réduisent leurs livraisons de lait pour protester 
contre la chute des prix au producteur et la suppression annoncée des quotas par la 
Commission européenne. La « grève du lait » est initiée par l’European Milk Board 
(EMB), comprenant associations et syndicats de producteurs, et promouvant un 
discours alternatif sur les régulations européenne et nationale. A l’échelle française, 
le Pays Basque fait montre d’un taux de participation à la grève très élevé. La grève 
de 2009 y témoigne de l’émergence d’un nouveau registre protestataire simultané-
ment transnational et local. La mobilisation informe d’abord sur les perceptions 
locales de la PAC et de l’intégration européenne. La grève, ensuite, interroge un 
clivage syndical binaire (FDSEA/ELB-Confédération paysanne) en faisant émer-
ger une association sectorielle spécialisée, l’APLI (Association de producteurs de 
lait indépendants), liée à l’EMB. La protestation génère dès lors une controverse 
publique où enjeux européens et territoriaux apparaissent comme inextricable-
ment liés.
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tions, French Basque Country
Syndicalisme agricole, coopératives, Politique agricole commune, mobilisations 
territoriales, Pays Basque français
* x.itcaina@sciencespobordeaux.fr
2 [11] Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case study1 presented here illustrates a methodological stance 
which favours a dual understanding of Europeanization phenomena, 
one which is sector-based as well as territory-based. Mobilization taken 
by farmers provides an apt subject for this kind of study: because of 
the strength of their representative organizations, farmers are capable 
of influencing the European decision-making process and/or to exert 
vigorous collective pressure at national level against European policies 
which they see as unfavourable. Protests by small farmers are generally 
internalized, in the sense that dissent is above all directed against 
national political targets in order to denounce measures taken in 
Brussels (Balme and Chabanet, 2008: 241). They may also take on a 
directly European dimension. This type of industrial action has often 
had some effect on the legitimacy of European institutions which 
may be perceived as “increasingly cut off from citizens and whose role, 
paradoxically, is never so fully identified than when it raises problems and 
spark opposition” (Balme and Chabanet, 2008: 241).
The study of Europeanized industrial action at a sub-national level is 
rich in lessons to be learned, particularly at regional level (Carter and 
Pasquier, 2010). Following Pasquier and Weisbein (2004), we propose 
here to study “Europe under the local microscope”, descending to a 
sub-regional and even sub-departmental level, though one marked by a 
strong territorial identity: the French Basque Country. Our intention is, 
by studying the territorial translations of sector-based industrial action, 
to answer the three questions raised by any “microscopic” analysis of 
Europeanization (Pasquier and Weisbein, 2004): who are the local 
actors, partners or competitors, who construct a meaning for Europe? 
On the basis of what forms of action and action repertoires is this 
meaning constructed? Does this common meaning produce a shared 
vision of the “remote” nature of the EU? 
1 My thanks to Mike Fay for the translation of this article, to Antoine Roger and 
Andy Smith, Romain Pasquier, Laurent Jalabert and Samuele Dossi for their com-
ments; to those interviewed for this research, especially Christian Harlouchet, 
who left us in June 2011. Earlier versions of this paper were discussed at the Euro-
pean Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, Boston, March 3-5, 2011 
and at the ECPR General Conference – Reykjavik (25-27 Aug. 2011), Section “The 
institutionalization of European spaces: interactions, practices and political work”. 
This research is part of a wider project on the territorial dynamics of social economy, 
supported by the CCRDT-Région Aquitaine.
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This set of questions will be illustrated by a study of the industrial 
action taken by cow milk producers during the crisis which affected 
this sector in 2008-2009. Although it is true that when farmers take 
major industrial action against the EU, this is mostly triggered by 
general reforms of the Common agricultural policy (CAP) (Saurugger, 
2004 ; Wolffe, 2009 p. 120), those sectors which have historically 
been very much supported by the CAP, such as the milk production 
sector, provide a notable exception to this rule (Wolffe, 2009). In turn, 
the sectorization of agricultural policy also leads to a sectorization 
of the forms which representation of interests takes, and thus to the 
emergence of specialized associations at a European level, alongside 
generalist, cross-sector trade unions. We will focus here on the milk 
deliveries strike carried out by producers in several European and 
French regions in 2009. In following the precedent of similar action 
in Germany in May 2008, French producers were participating in the 
construction of a European repertoire of protest action. In this sense, 
the milk strike represents a form of “Europeanization from below” of 
a sector-based protest (Della Porta and Caiani, 2007; Monforte, 2010). 
At the same time, however, reactions to the strike within the local, 
national and European landscape are evidence of an extended range 
of forms of Europeanization, ranging from radical protest to collective 
actions whose nature is closer to that of special interest groups. 
We will see the territorial translation of this to the French Basque 
Country, a choice of region which is doubly relevant. On the one 
hand, the Basque Country was one of the French regions where the 
September 2009 strike had the strongest support. Secondly, the milk 
strike upset a local balance between trade unions based on a split which 
is both sector-based (two conceptions of agriculture) and identity-
based (two conceptions of territorial identity). Rather than addressing 
the whole set of issues raised by the milk crisis, this article centres on 
the forms of industrial action which were activated on this occasion. 
We propose to illustrate, at territorial level, the hypothesis developed 
by Roullaud (2010) about the 2009 strike. Roullaud sees it as revealing 
a dual phenomenon: the sectorization of trade union representation 
with the strengthening of sector- and industry-based organizations, 
and the resonance of the European dimension in conceptualizations 
of the issues and collective action. Both these generic elements were 
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present on the Basque scene. Grafted on to this was a local context 
marked by a bipolarity of trade union representation, itself challenged 
by an atypical form of industrial action. We shall examine, following a 
sequential approach, the stages of this mobilization. Section 1 of this 
article briefly reviews the causes of the crisis. Section 2 analyses the 
strike itself in the Basque Country, the sociology of the actors involved 
and the forms which action took, before identifying (in section 3) some 
research paths concerning the consequences of this industrial action 
and the plural forms of Europeanization experienced by the actors2.
1.TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL ACTION:  
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AND CHANGES TO REGULATION 
A European Crisis
At a national French level, the milk crisis is part of one of the worst 
crises which the agricultural sector has experienced over the past thirty 
years, with a 20% fall in the average income of farmers in 20083. The 
crisis in the cattle and milk products sector was caused by a sharp drop 
in the price of milk to a level never previously reached, even in 2006, 
itself a very bad year. This fall, in part attributable to the fall in demand, 
followed a rise which was just as exceptional on a European scale in 
2007. These fluctuations are evidence, firstly of the great sensitivity of 
mechanisms for fixing prices on world markets (for milk powder and 
butter), alongside those of European markets (ordinary cheeses and 
mass consumption products) and internal markets (high-value quality 
products). In 2007, prices shot up following a continuous increase in 
demand from Asian countries and a fall in the production of some 
exporting nations. European producers, especially German and French 
ones, reacted by increasing their production, which was allowed by 
2 This work originated in the Mouvements paysans, Politique Agricole Commune 
et Mondialisation dans les régions de l’Arc Atlantique (Peasant Movements, Common 
Agricultural Policy and Globalisation in the Atlantic Arc) study day at the Université 
de Nantes, 4 December 2009. In Spring 2010 a survey was carried out in the Basque 
Country of media and professional sources and by means of a series of interviews of 
members of the FDSEA and ELB unions, the APLI Association and a milk collection 
and processing cooperative. This data was updated in spring 2011.
3 Sud Ouest, 3 September 2009.
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weakening quota arrangements. This increase simultaneously caused 
a sharp fall in prices in now deregulated markets. European surpluses 
were then dumped onto countries in the South, supported by export 
subsidies (Cassez and Trouvé, 2010)4. 
These economic fluctuations, which had a direct effect on producers’ 
incomes, took place in a context of changes in public regulation of 
the sector. At the level of the European Union (EU), the programmed 
end of the quota system was ratified by Ministers of Agriculture on 20 
November 2008. The aim was to liberalize production levels, lower prices 
to consumers and strengthen the sector’s competitiveness. Overall, the 
system of regulation based on controlling production rights by means of 
quotas since 1984, Community preference (taxation of milk imported 
into Europe), and intervention to regulate surplus stocks had until then 
enabled price variations to be limited and their effects on the producer 
cushioned. In 2003, the EU planned for a progressive dismantling of 
quotas until 1 April 2015, a weakening of Community preference under 
pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United 
States, and a reduction in intervention funds. In parallel, the CAP 
reform of 2003 replaced public funding of market support by direct 
aid to cattle farmers (milk support, which became single payment 
entitlements). The link between income payments to producers, the 
quantities produced and market support was broken. In 2006, the 
effects of an essentially market-based deregulation began to be felt, 
with strong fluctuations in price and a considerable drop in prices. In 
2007-2008, the cost of raw materials, food and energy increased, which 
increased production costs for milk.
This deregulationary turning point was strengthened at the French 
national level by an order from the General Directorate for Competition 
and Suppression of Fraud5 (DGCCRF) in April 2008 to inter-branch 
organizations that they should end the price recommendation 
mechanisms which had till then been negotiated within the inter-branch 
organization at national level (CNIEL, the National Inter-branch Centre 
4 In France, it was decided in 2008 to produce less milk, in particular by stopping the 
loan against the individual quota in order to avoid exacerbating the surplus of milk on 
the market.
5 Direction générale de la concurrence et de la répression des fraudes
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for the Milk Economy)6 and regional level (CRIEL) between producers 
(represented by the FNPL, the milk producers’ branch of the FNSEA7, 
the National Federation of Farmers’ Trade Unions), industrial-scale 
dairy companies (FNIL8, the National Federation of Milk Industries) and 
cooperatives (FNCL9, the National Federation of Milk Cooperatives). 
Issuing national recommendations for the price of milk could now lead 
to an accusation of distorting competition, albeit in a context of very high 
prices for milk. Despite this order, negotiations were opened between 
industrial-scale operators and producer representatives at inter-branch 
level, against a backdrop of industrial action outside milk production 
plants. On 3 June 2009, the FNPL reached agreement with industrial 
operators on the basis of an average price for milk of 280 euros per 
1,000 litres in 2009. In doing so, the FNPL acknowledged the end of the 
quota system and of this form of regulation, advocating adaptation to 
the new situation by means of contractual relations between producers 
and large-scale dairy firms. The agreement was criticized by minority 
trades union organizations (Confédération paysanne, the Peasants’ 
Confederation, and Coordination rurale, Rural Coordination,) and by 
the new National Association of Independent Milk Producers (APLI)10. 
Criticism was made of the FNPL’s monopoly right within the inter-
branch organization to represent producers and against the terms of 
an agreement felt to be too favourable towards industrial dairy firms. 
A Changing Sector in the Basque Country
 
These developments were closely followed in the Basque Country, 
where the dairy sector remains dynamic despite structural changes. 
The Pyrénées-Atlantiques department, with around 1100 producers, 
produces about one third of the milk collected in Aquitaine. In the 
Basque Country, estimates of the number of producers active in 2010 
vary between 350 and 450. The Basque Country, with 60 million litres, 
represents a little more than a third of production within the department 
as a whole, with around a third of producers. On average, each farm 
produces between 160,000 and 200,000 litres (according to estimates), 
6 Centre national interprofessionnel de l’économie laitière
7 Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles
8 Fédération nationale des industries laitières
9 Fédération nationale des coopératives laitières
10 Association des Producteurs de Lait Indépendants.
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such production levels and quotas being slightly lower than across the 
department as a whole. When quotas were fixed in 1983, there were 
5,400 cow milk producers within the department. This figure had gone 
down to 1,100 in 2009, a fall of 79% in 27 years. In the Basque Country, 
cow milk is in decline in mountainous areas, to the extent that it has 
disappeared in some cantons, such as Tardets and Baigorry, which now 
specialize in ewe’s milk and beef cattle. In the Soule province, with one 
exception, the ten or so cow milk producers are concentrated in Lower 
Soule (Basse-Soule). Today, cow milk producers are distributed across 
all hill and plain areas. Some areas near to the Landes (Bardos-Bidache) 
are important centres of milk production. 
In contrast to other types of production, cow milk, as a raw material, 
is highly dependent on industrial methods and markets. Although 
Basque producers are developing direct sales, this remains a minority 
or complementary option. The great majority of production is collected 
by dairies which are either cooperatives or privately-owned. In 2009-
2010, Danone remains the principal private operator, alongside the 
much smaller Chaumes. Among the cooperatives, some, such as 
Berria or 3A, carry out both collection and processing of milk. Others 
concentrate on collection, such as CLPB11, the Basque Country Milk 
Cooperative, with 38 producers, and Haize Hegoa, which however 
carries out little collection in the Basque Country. Collection 
cooperatives sell the milk on to private operators who process it. The 
uncertain nature of commercial relations with private operators can 
lead certain cooperatives to place their milk, by default, on the SPOT 
market, an instantaneous market between dairies, which is volatile and 
subject to strong speculative pressures. In fact, the high dependency of 
producers on dairies makes them vulnerable to commercial strategies 
and to upstream negotiations between industrial-scale operators and 
group purchasing organizations. The 2008 crisis hit this already fragile 
area of milk production, and pushed producers into adopting various 
strategies in order to deal with it. 
 
 
 
11 Coopérative laitière du Pays Basque
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2. INDUSTRIAL ACTION: THE STRIKE AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE APLI
A new system of actors?
Reactions to the crisis were not expressed univocally. The context of 
the crisis initially favoured the emergence of new trade-union or para 
trade-union organizations, structured at both national and European 
levels (Roullaud, 2010). In France, the emergence of the APLI was part 
of these developments. In the Basque Country, APLI’s appearance upset 
a trade union landscape marked by a binary cleavage. Farmers’ trade 
union activities had stabilized since the 1980s around a split between 
FDSEA12, the Departmental Federation of Farmers’ Trade Unions and 
ELB (Euskal herriko laborarien batasuna, the Union of Basque Country 
Peasants (or small farmers), the Basque branch of the national and left-
oriented CP13, the Peasant’s Confederation. Opposition between these 
two trade unions is as much over agricultural models as over questions 
of territorial identity, with the ELB calling for management institutions 
specific to Basque agriculture. The split is expressed in particular through 
a territorial and judicial controversy over the Euskal herriko laborantxa 
ganbara (Basque Country Chamber of Agriculture) association set up 
in 2005 by the ever-changing small farmers’ agriculture movement 
(Itçaina, 2011). The milk strike saw the sudden entry on the scene of 
a third actor, though not a trade union but a specialized association, 
the APLI (Association of Independent Milk Producers) which from the 
outset was structured on a European Basis.
The emergence of the APLI
The APLI was created in France in December 2008. At the European 
level, the APLI includes the European Milk Board (EMB), an essentially 
Franco-German structure, which since 2006 has chosen not to affiliate 
to COPA-COGECA, the main institutionalized special interest group 
representing agricultural trade unions and cooperatives at the European 
level. The EMB aims, by means of parallel mobilization, to work for a 
European supervisory body representing all actors within the milk industry. 
12 Fédération départementale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles
13 Confédération paysanne
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In France, the APLI began in the Tarn, Ariège, Aveyron and other 
Southern departments from a nucleus of around fifteen producers who 
specialized in genetics, and who for several years had been attempting 
to promote alternative approaches to those adopted at national level, 
especially inspired by the Canadian model. This nucleus followed the 
German milk strike of May 2008 with interest, and began to consider 
an equivalent action in France. A first meeting was held in the Aveyron 
in October 2008, bringing together 350 persons from 9 departments. 
Producers in difficulty who were disappointed by majority trade union 
activities were able to express themselves at this meeting. The APLI 
emerged from these meetings in associative, non-trade union form, 
and began to consider the forms which action might take. Producers 
took part in blockades of dairies and in the industrial action at the end 
of 2008. Dissatisfied with the intra-branch organization agreement of 3 
June 2009, they cast about for other means of action. 
The APLI established itself in particular in fragile milk-producing 
areas, including the South-West of France. The movement reached 
the Basque Country in the person of a Basque producer located in the 
Tarn department, who as a result shared the APLI’s views. Returning 
to the Basque Country, he set up business with an associate in the 
Soule province. In autumn 2008, two Basque producers considered 
making an initial attempt to hold a strike at the beginning of 2009, 
organizing a first meeting in November 2008 near Tarbes. At the end 
of 2008 and beginning of 2009, several industrial actions (blockades 
of group purchasing organizations, occupations of superstores, etc.) 
led to an agreement with the industrials. Judging this progress to be 
insufficient, the APLI relaunched a cycle of meetings in spring 2009. 
This mobilization associated producers from the Basque Country, 
Béarn, the Hautes-Pyrénées, Ariège, etc. At the Basque level, starting 
with its nucleus in Soule and Lower Navarre, the movement found 
support in Bardos, Came and the Cize valley, reaching Saint-Pée sur 
Nivelle and the Basque coast. Basque producers, together with their 
immediate neighbours in Béarn and the Landes, comprise the Landes-
Pyrénées-Atlantiques section of the APLI. This led to the setting up 
of structure favourable to widespread industrial action, which was not 
long in coming.
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APLI militants in the Basque Country aimed to stabilize their 
movement around certain key ideas. On the one hand, the APLI claims 
to be independent, presenting itself as an associative, non-trade union 
structure, which aims to distance itself from the split between the 
FDSEA and the ELB: 
“Given the fall in incomes, there is no longer a split. I think that 
today, in the Basque Country like everywhere else, all trade unions 
have lost power because things have come to this. Now nobody says 
“he is an FDSEA man”, or “he is an ELB man”. They have lost some 
of their power. People are no longer afraid of trade unions, but 
nobody worships them either. The shine has come off them. Today 
we have realized that it was necessary for there to be trades unions 
on different sides, and I think that people have understood that 
they had to take action. I think that out there it’s the APLI which 
has won out.”14
The rejection of ideologies, the denunciation of bureaucratic trade 
unionism and the priority given to pragmatism and the sectoral 
interests of producers are emphasized by the APLI. The Association 
then developed some alternative thinking about institutions: instead of 
trying at any price to include forums for negotiation (such as the inter-
branch organization) judged to be ineffective, the APLI aimed instead 
at promoting parallel instruments of regulation. Finally, the Basque 
promoters of the APLI are unquestionable masters of media relations 
and use of the Internet. This meant that a new type of social movement 
had come to the fore, impelled not by trade unions, but by farmers in 
difficulty without long experience of this type of industrial action, who 
come from a fragile milk-producing centre, and are the bearers of a 
potential challenge to existing forms of support from trade unions. 
FDSEA: Strikes as an ineffective form of action
As the majority trade union at departmental and national levels, the 
FDSEA took up a critical position towards the strike. Rather than 
encouraging producers to harm themselves in search of an uncertain 
result, the Federation preferred to promote the negotiations route 
14 APLI interview, 29 March 2010.
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with a view to setting up contractual relations with the industrial 
operators, via groupings of producers and inter-branch organization 
negotiations. As regards the forms of industrial action, while sharing 
the view that market liberalization was the root cause and advocating 
the continuation of regulatory instruments, the FDSEA preferred 
other forms of action, such as regional and national action days or the 
organization of a regional conference on milk production issues. At the 
end of the strike, the FNSEA organized a grand national day of action 
to demand an emergency plan and to denounce the fall in agricultural 
incomes. 
The position of the FDSEA was the subject of debate within its own 
ranks. During a meeting of around a hundred milk producers in front 
of the Maison de l’Agriculture (House of Agriculture) in Pau, several 
FDSEA members symbolically tore up their union membership cards, 
and some of them joined the APLI. For its part, the Pyrénées-Atlantiques 
Young Farmers trade union (JA64) took the exact opposite view to that 
taken by its national union by declaring itself in “solidarity with the 
actions being taken”15, without however formally calling a strike. 
ELB or selective support
After mature reflection, ELB decided to join the APLI in calling a strike. 
On a national level, the Peasants’ Confederation declared itself on 10 
September 2009 to be in “solidarity with the milk strike which is being 
carried out”16 and aims to support the strikers in their action. This 
being so, the Confederation left each departmental federation free to 
position itself. In the Basque Country, the ELB the APLI agreed three 
claims: a price which remunerates the labour value and production 
cost, limitation of the amounts of milk produced to the level which 
the market can pay for; a refusal of any system of contractual relations, 
which would leave producers at the mercy of dairies. The national inter-
branch organization, in particular, was at the heart of criticisms, insofar 
15 Sud Ouest Pays Basque, 17 September 2009.
16 Confédération paysanne, « Grève du lait : la Confédération paysanne soutient les 
grévistes et mènera des actions complémentaires », (“Milk Strike: Confédération pay-
sanne supports the strikers and will carry out supporing actions”) Press Release, 10 
September 2009. 
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as the minority trade unions were not represented within the CNIEL17.
Before the strike, in July 2009 during an action at the sub-prefecture of 
Bayonne, ELB was already reaffirming its analysis of European policy. 
Guaranteed stable prices required supply levels to be adjusted to European 
demand. The union opined that the 10% of European production 
exported at low prices on the global market were responsible for 
current problems. Hence its position in favour of a policy of controlling 
production, as the best policy for producers (in both the North and 
South of the planet), consumers and taxpayers. ELB and the Peasants’ 
Confederation called for a change in policy which should in the first 
instance take the form of a decrease in European milk production in 
order to re-establish the conditions for a remunerative price. Although 
historically ELB and the Peasants’ Confederation were critical of the 
quota systems (because distribution mechanisms and the calculation 
method based on reference to historic production levels had favoured 
individualistic behaviours and worsened overproduction) the union 
was now asking, in the absence of alternatives, for the maintenance 
of this system of regulation and the organization of thoroughgoing 
governmental controls.
At the beginning of September, the ELB made clear its position on the 
milk crisis. The union acknowledged the launch of the strike by the APLI 
and the EMB. The ELB did not decide to join the strike but to support 
the producers out on strike: “the decision is for each producer, freely 
and according to his conscience”18. The union would support all forms 
of struggle which included the three following objectives: a guaranteed 
remunerative price; control of volumes at the level of the needs of the 
EU internal market, plus creditworthy export markets, in other words 
reducing the current volume by 5% to 7%; solidarity between producers 
(the reduction in volume must be proportionally greater for the highest 
volumes of production so that small producers could retain some 
chance of growth). These demands were reiterated during an action 
17 « Prix du lait : les syndicats minoritaires et l’APLI demandent au ministre d’organiser 
une table ronde », (Milk Price: minority unions and the APLI call on the minister to 
organize a Round Table”. La France agricole, 1 December 2009 ; Laborari, 587, 9 July 
2009; 862, 10 September 2009; 867, 22 October 2009.
18 Laborari, 861, 3 September 2009.
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at the Departmental Directorate for Agriculture (DDA)19 at Bayonne 
after the strike on 19 October 2009. The announcement of a European 
subsidy of 280 million euros to assist the milk and milk products sector 
was held to be insufficient and primarily aimed at ending the social 
movement20. At the beginning of October, ELB deplored the fact that 
the demands of the group of 20 countries for a new system of European 
regulation had met with the “intransigence” of Mrs. Fischer Boel21. 
ELB’s support for the strike was a decisive gain for the APLI. Neck and 
neck with the FDSEA in the (Basque part of the) Pyrénées-Atlantiques 
Chamber of Agriculture elections, ELB had a well-consolidated base on 
this territory and well-tried industrial action know-how from which 
the 2009 strike benefited. On the Spanish Basque side of the border, the 
EHNE (Euskal Herriko Nekezarien Elkartea) union, a member of the 
Spanish COAG22 union, supported the strike on the French side. 
A New Repertoire of Actions? 
The milk strike proper took place in September 2009. It followed several 
conventional forms of protest mobilizations, such as the handouts of 
milk made by ELB members in a superstore on the French Basque coast 
on 18 May 2009. In June, the situation hardened at national level, despite 
the agreement on 3 June. Blockades were imposed on distribution 
centres for superstores; clashes with police took place in Brittany. In 
July in the Basque Country, ELB producers blockaded several milk 
collection trucks, then, escorted by around ten tractors, drove to the 
Bayonne sub-prefecture to demand more involvement from public 
authorities23. ELB also called upon Basque producers to take part in 
industrial action organized at European level, such as the three “milk 
caravans” organized by the Peasant’s Confederation which drove to 
Strasbourg for Bastille Day, the 14 July. The demonstration brought 
together small farmer members of ECVC, Coordination européenne 
Via campesina and the EMB. At the beginning of September 2009, 
ELB producers took part in a demonstration organized in Bordeaux 
19 Direction départementale de l’agriculture
20 Laborari, 867, 22 October 2009.
21 Laborari, 865, 8 October 2009.
22 Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos
23 Laborari, 9 July 2009.
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by the Peasants’ Confederation, with a distribution of milk, fruit and 
vegetables, to demand “the ditching of the European Commission’s 
policy of destroying agriculture.”24 
The milk strike represented a qualitative leap in forms of industrial action. 
The choice of action repertoire was motivated by the ineffectiveness of 
the methods used until then, especially that of blockades, which can 
only have a limited legal duration. The mobilization was inspired by 
the German precedent but it was also part of a long history of repeated 
crises experience by the milk and milk products sector caused by 
overproduction, from the 1950s until the imposition of quotas in 1984 
(Mission d’animation des agrobiosciences, 2009). Probably the most 
striking parallel is with the French milk strike of 1972, which in its time 
strongly marked the relationship between trade unionism and cooperatives, 
especially in departments in the West of France (Peyron, 1992). 
For the APLI, the only way to hit industrial operators was to penalize 
them financially through a milk collection strike. The message was 
simple: given the gap between industrial operators’ margins and the 
price paid to producers, one might as well give milk away or even 
throw it away. The use of the language of strikes, even of slogans 
which are more in the tradition of wage earners than of proprietors 
or independent workers provides a good reflection of the dependency 
on large-scale dairies experienced by milk producers (Bonhommeau, 
2010). The APLI called for a revaluation of the price of milk to 400 
euros per 1000 litres. At national level, the APLI and the Organization 
of Milk Producers (OPL)25, affiliated to the Coordination rurale union, 
were the main spearheads of the strike. At the beginning of August, a 
meeting of milk producers from the French Basque Country at Sare let it 
be known that they would call a milk strike, thus taking up, via the APLI, 
the EMB’s call to strike. In so doing they made use of a European strike 
tactic, which also brought them closer to strategies which had until then 
belonged to other industrial sectors (Groux and Pernot, 2008). 
The strike proper lasted about two weeks, depending on the producers. 
At first the uncollected milk was distributed on farms or in squares 
24 Laborari, 861, 3 September 2009.
25 Organisation des producteurs de lait
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in around 20 municipalities. At Bayonne, producers from the Bidache 
canton made gifts of milk to Secours catholique (Caritas France) for a 
district which had been affected by flooding. Since health regulations 
made it difficult to make donations to hospitals or schools, distributions 
to these remained limited. After a week, the industrial action became 
more widespread. Some producers threw the milk into the slurry pit or 
over fields (including 15 tanker loads by 70 producers in the canton of 
Bidache26). 5,000 litres of milk were dumped in front of the Bayonne 
sub-prefecture on 23 September. Filtering road blocks were organized 
on 21 September 2009 by around fifty tractors outside the Chaumes 
cheese plant at Jurançon, and outside the 3A at Lons and Berria at 
Macaye. Outside Chaumes, the strikers observed a minute’s silence in 
memory of the seven farmers who have committed suicide in France 
since the beginning of the crisis. On 23 September, three trucks full of 
milk produced by non-strikers were intercepted at Ayherre, Saint-Pée 
and Briscous and were hijacked to the Bayonne sub-prefecture, where a 
fourth tanker, containing milk produced by strikers, was standing by to 
distribute milk to the population27. Mobilization in the Basque Country 
reached some of the highest levels in the country, even though actors 
within the sector were far from agreeing on the numbers taking part. 
According to the APLI, the strike was observed by 80% of producers 
in the Basque Country. ELB talked of 70-80% in the Basque Country 
at departmental level. According to the FDSEA, this figure should be 
35%, since one-or two-day solidarity strikes should not be accounted 
for. Nevertheless, this participation rate was still above the national 
average. 
The APLI emphasized the personal, voluntary and responsible nature 
of the action. All sides emphasize the intensity of the discussions or 
even pressures exerted between producers, neighbours or within 
families about the timing or appropriateness of the strike. In one 
GAEC28 cooperative, where two brothers were in disagreement over 
the principle of the strike, milk was thrown away after every second 
milking. Other situations were more tense. The decision whether to 
embark on the strike or not had to take account of an infinite number 
26 Sud Ouest Pays Basque, 11, 15, 17, 19 and 21 September 2009.
27 Sud Ouest Pays Basque, 24 septembre 2009.
28 Groupement agricole d’exploitation en commun.
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of factors, especially in the context of a small family holding. In another 
GAEC29, for example, although the strike’s promoter was an associate 
from outside the family circle, the views of the local farmer and the 
parents were decisive. The symbolic violence of the gesture went well 
beyond mere economic loss. All parties, whether in favour of the strike 
or against it, agreed how difficult it was to take this action. ELB was at 
first reluctant to back a milk strike, before finally deciding to support 
the strikers:
“Too much respect. It’s unthinkable, it’s unthinkable for us to 
throw away our production. This is a foodstuff. It’s not like any 
other production. It’s a foodstuff. And it’s also our production. It 
is something for which we have great respect. And throwing that 
away, really, it’s unthinkable.”30 
 
For this producer in the north of the Soule province, the manager of a 
cooperative and a non-striker, the form of action above all points to a 
situation of helplessness and confusion:
“Throwing away your product when you are responsible for one’s 
product. We’re not someone’s employees. If you throw away your 
product, you know what you are doing. It’s a helpless, confused 
form of action. They wanted to say ‘We are on the brink of the abyss, 
there has been no solution up till now, and this is the only solution 
we can see.’ I think that with this action, with all this moving the 
milk around, the authorities have got the message. There have been 
lots of people, ministers and so on, who came down to have a look 
at what is happening with milk production, who had no idea of the 
helplessness and confusion in the milk industry. There are people 
who have committed themselves to finding solutions, so that in 
future there will be a milk price that allows you to at least make a 
living. It’s definitely true that there has been a favourable impact 
in the media.”31 
29 Groupement agricole d’exploitation en commun. Joint venture farming.
30 ELB Interview, 10 March 2010, Ainhice-Mongelos, translated from Basque.
31 Interview, milk co-operative manager, 20 May 2010.
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For the APLI, the strength of the industrial action came from the very 
fact that the strike was a form of violence which the producer inflicted 
most of all on himself. Holding fast to this principle, the APLI refused 
to turn towards tougher forms of action targeting industrial operators 
or wholesalers. In the Basque Country, as on the European level 
(Roullaud, 2010), the strike organisers aimed to shake off the violent 
image associated with demonstrations by farmers. What was being 
enacted here, relatively speaking, was a high media-impact strategy 
of self-violence which ultimately has more in common with types of 
action such as hunger strikes than with violent actions (Siméant, 2009). 
A social movement with a strong media and socio-political impact 
Beyond the sector, the success of any social movement consists of gaining 
support from public opinion. On this level, the strike’s “scandalising” 
strategy (Roullaud, 2010) was a success. Inevitably, media focus leads to 
simplification of the issues. It nevertheless contributed towards raising 
public awareness and towards conferring European status on the cause. 
In parallel to the strike itself, more traditional action repertoires were 
put into action. Several meetings were organized. Some were quite 
small, but with a symbolic content, such as the demonstration outside 
the holiday home of Bruno le Maire, the Minister of Agriculture, at 
Saint-Pée sur Nivelle, attended by local councillors. About a hundred 
producers held a meeting outside the Maison de l’Agriculture in Pau; on 
5 October, a large procession of 150 famers at the wheel of their tractors 
passed through Bayonne, on 19 October, about 30 milk producer 
members of the ELB and APLI laid siege to DDA in Bayonne, on the 
22nd, the National President of the APLI addressed 500 farmers at Pau. 
Filter blockades of dairies were still taking place at the end of the strike. 
Action by local councillors in support of producers was very evident. 
The Town Council of Saint-Pée-sur-Nivelle and neighbouring 
municipalities took action. Around ten mayors of small municipalities 
accompanied the ELB-APLI demonstration at the beginning of October 
2009 in Bayonne. The Community of municipalities in Baigorri-
Garazi unanimously adopted a motion supporting cow milk producers 
intended for the EU and calling for the valley’s inhabitants to get their 
supplies directly from the striking farmers. The General Council of 
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the Pyrénées-Atlantiques department expressed its solidarity with 
the sector. The Regional Council took action by organising regional 
coordination. The strike also gave rise to less conventional reactions 
in support of the strikers, such as those by the Basque nationalist party 
Batasuna or that of the Bishop of Bayonne. 
3. INDUSTRIAL ACTION WITH A PLURALITY OF EFFECTS
The purely financial consequences of the strike were relatively minor 
for industrial operators and cooperatives. According to the FDSEA, 
there was a milk shortfall of around 35% over this period. For this 
large cooperative, which involves around 115 Basque producers, the 
economic impact was minimal with 7% of milk lost during the month 
of the strike, a figure affected by the fact that the strike took place 
during a period when milk was in surplus32. In contrast, the financial 
loss was much more consequential for the producers who went on 
strike, especially for those who prolonged their strike over more than 
ten days. Aside from individual situations, the milk strike led to three 
sets of consequences affecting modes of regulating the sector, the 
balance between local trade unions, and social consequences for the 
community.
Consequences for the political regulation of the sector 
The strike publicized the fundamental debate on the public (local, 
national and European) regulation of the sector. Recognizing that 
the quota system would definitely disappear, the FDSEA advocated 
recourse to contractual relations in order to regulate the price of milk:
“This means that we have to organize on a collective basis in order 
to offer supplies en masse, to stand up to industrial operators, it 
means that we must talk on an equal basis. The legal framework 
must allow us to do this. So we can say ‘Here, what volume do you 
need at what price? And we compare prices and start on that basis. 
Broadly speaking the contract will make things more visible for the 
farmer so he knows what his starting point is. In the knowledge 
32 Ibid.
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that these days the industrial operator says: there is too much milk 
around so I pay you badly, because it’s difficult for me to sell. In this 
case we start in the opposite direction. We say ‘we’re not producing 
this milk, or if we do produce it, it has to be for a decent average 
price. We can also be willing, if in the event the milk is fetching a 
good price, there can be a quid pro quo, there can be part of the 
milk which does not fetch a “good” (in inverted commas) price, if 
the average price is OK. It’s for us to choose.”33 
This form of contractual relations would avoid farmers having to 
position themselves within markets which are too volatile, such as the 
SPOT market, and be able to position themselves in internal European 
markets, especially the Spanish one where French products have to 
compete against German milk. In the Basque Country, some producers 
anticipated a national legislative framework, especially by organizing 
themselves into a group of producers with a partnership contract with 
Danone. The agreement enables producers to negotiate with the firm 
a price which is better than the price negotiated at the inter-branch 
organization level. It also allows for better adaptation to reciprocal 
quality demands. 
This type of contractual relations requires on the one hand a stabilized 
framework for negotiations at the level of the inter-branch organization 
between producers, cooperatives and industrial operators by virtue of 
the agreement of 3 June 2009, a stabilization which cannot necessarily 
be taken for granted. On 18 March 2010, discussions were broken 
off during the CNIEL meeting of inter-branch organizations. The 
FNIL (milk industries) in particular, asked for the introduction of a 
competitiveness indicator in order to rebalance the differential between 
France and Germany. A trial of strength followed between producers 
and industrial operators which was ended by an agreement concluded 
on 30 March 2010 under Ministry pressure. The price of milk over the 
next quarterly periods would have to be fixed in accordance with new 
indexes which were to take account of the price gap between French 
milk and German milk, production costs and world prices for industrial 
products (butter and milk powder)34.
33 Interview FDSEA Basque Country, 26 March 2010.
34 « Industriels et producteurs satisfaits de l’accord sur le lait » (“Industrial operators 
20 [11] Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  
If it is to be stabilized, a set of contractual relations next requires a legal 
framework, both on a national and a European level. In March 2010, the 
FNPL took their case to the European Commissioners for Competition 
and for Agriculture and Rural Development35. The FNPL was in 
particular reacting following a report by European experts promoting 
the grouping together of farmers into cooperatives in order to constitute 
a strong negotiating partner for industrial operators. According to the 
FNPL, strict respect for European competition rules would lead to a limit 
of 150 on the number of producers associating. Moreover, determining 
an equitable price can only take place by means of writing in pricing 
clauses based on indexes recognized by both industrial operators and 
producers. The FNPL therefore formulated three proposals. On the one 
hand, in order to rebalance power relations between a dispersed group 
of producers and a small number of processors and wholesalers, the 
FNPL proposed the formation of groupings of farmers at regional or 
inter-regional production area level, without these organizations being 
systematically held to be horizontal entities by competition authorities. 
Secondly, the FNPL called for Europe and Member States to set up 
legal mechanisms with the aim of strengthening protection of sector 
producers against industrial operators. These European guidelines on 
good contractual practice could then be invoked by producers in the 
framework of their commercial relationships. Finally, the FNPL called 
for formal authorization by the EU of a mandate to enable producers to 
organize collectively. The FNPL was thus criticizing the encouragement 
of farmers to organize into milk-collecting cooperatives. This would 
not give them sufficient means of exerting pressure on industrial 
operators, compared with a union of producers within the dairy 
business. The FNPL called for a legal framework which would enable 
price negotiations to be carried out by the producers’ trade union, 
but with no transfer of ownership, which would remain in the hands 
of the industrial operator. In the framework thus described, regional 
organization on the basis of milk producing areas seemed to represent 
the best way of maintaining production in all territories after the final 
and producers satisfied with the milk agreement”), Le Monde, 30 March 2010.
35 Frédéric Hénin, Terre-net Média, « Prix du lait. La FNNPL dénonce l’inadéqua-
tion du droit à la concurrence avec les objectifs de la PAC » (Milk Price. The FNPL 
denounces the mismatch between competition law and CAP objectives”, 24 March 2010 
(http://www.web-agri.fr/actualite-agricole/politique-syndicalisme/article-fnpl-ciolos-
prix-du-lait-commission-europeenne-1145-61862.html).
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disappearance of quotas. Similarly, the FNPL as well as the French 
Ministry of Agriculture welcomed the report published in June 2010 
by the European High Level Group (GHN)36 et up after the strike in 
October. This report in particular recommended the strengthening 
of contractual relations between producers and industrial operators. 
These measures would require significant adjustments to legislation, 
especially as regards competition rules. The FNPL saw it as recognizing 
the existence of an imbalance between milk producers and industrial 
operators37.
Clearly, the new regulatory arrangements made at national and European 
level confirmed the movement towards contractual relations. At 
national level, the Law on modernising agriculture, definitively adopted 
on 13 July 2010 following its passing by the French Senate, provides 
for contracts between farmers and processors from 1st April 2011. The 
European Commission’s legislative proposal on “contractual relations 
in the milk and milk products sector” published on 9 December 2010 
confirms this direction. Following the GHN report, the Commission’s 
proposal aims to strengthen the position of producers within the 
supply chain and to prepare the sector for a more market-oriented and 
sustainable: “it provides for written contracts between milk producers 
and processors, the possibility to negotiate contract terms collectively via 
producer organisations in a way as to balance the bargaining power of 
milk producers relative to major processors, specific EU rules for inter-
branch organisations and measures for enhancing transparency in the 
market”38.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Groupe de Haut Niveau
37 Euractiv, « Lait : le groupe de haut niveau rend ses conclusions » (“Milk: the High Le-
vel Group submits its conclusions”), 17 June 2010, http://www.euractiv.fr/lait-groupe-
niveau-rend-conclusions-article. 
38 European Commission, “Milk and milk products” (Legislative Proposal, 9 Decem-
ber 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/milk/index_en.htm
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Box 1. The European Commission’s Legislative Proposal (9 December 2010)
Extracts from “Milk package to stabilise the EU dairy sector.” (European 
Commission, 2010)
Actions to be taken by the EU:
- Milk production comes under Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy. The EU 
is responsible for ensuring that CAP-related measures are applied by all member 
countries
-  However, since contract law is not the same everywhere39, countries will still be 
able to decide whether or not to make contracts between farmers and processors 
compulsory.
What exactly will change?
•  formal contracts will encourage those involved in all parts of the dairy industry 
to:
-  be more aware of the state of the market
-  respond better to signs of changes in the market
-  keep wholesale and retail prices more in line with prices paid to farmers
-  adapt supply to demand
-  end unfair commercial practices
•  dairy farmers will have more collective bargaining power because they will be 
allowed to negotiate prices and contracts as part of a producer organisation
•  “inter-branch” organisations will bring together actors from the whole supply 
chain:
-  improving knowledge of production and the market
-  making for better-coordinated research
-  promoting best practices in production and processing
Who will benefit and how?
-  Dairy farmers – who will have a stronger bargaining position thanks to better 
milk delivery contracts and the option to negotiate prices collectively.
-  The whole dairy chain – farmers, processors, distributors and retailers will all 
benefit from greater transparency.
When are the measures likely to come into effect?
2012 (after adoption by the European Parliament and Council)
There have been contrasting reactions to the Commission’s proposal. 
39 In particular, some cooperatives whose statutes have rules with similar effects would 
be exempted from having to conclude such contracts.
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FNPL and FNSEA
The FNPL and FNSEA welcomed “the Commission’s recognition of 
their call to rebalance commercial relations between producers and 
processors and the help given by the French Minister of Agriculture 
(Bruno Le Maire) on this question”40. The measures envisaged by the 
Commission enable a strengthening of the collective organization of 
producers, an increase in their negotiating power, arrangements to 
ensure transparency of markets in the milk and milk products sector, 
and recognition of the role of inter-branch organizations. As regards 
collective action, the FNPL and FNSEA pointed out that if the project 
put forward by the Commission includes the measures they had been 
asking for, this is the result of the “long-term work carried out in 
Brussels over several years to support the milk and milk products sector, 
whether in representations to the European Commission or within 
COPA-COGECA” (ibid.). The product of a tradition of co-management, 
the FNSEA-FNPL developed a three-pronged strategy to gain access to 
the European level: national ministry, direct access to the Commission, 
and action via a European special interest group (COPA-COGECA). 
Instead of only reacting during the phase which follows consideration 
by EU instances, or the implementation phases of European policies, 
the action taken by the FNPL-FNSEA is a manifestation, at trade union 
level, of an ex ante or “bottom-up” approach, which occurs “in the ex 
ante phase of the policy cycle, when domestic policies are ‘up loaded’ to the 
European level for negotiation” (Carter and Pasquier, 2006: 12).
 
ELB and the Peasants’ Confederation
ELB and the Peasants’ Confederation remained critical of the formula 
for contractual relations. The spectre of an evolution similar to that 
which occurred in the pig and poultry sectors was not encouraging. For 
the union, the risk of contractual relations was that it gave industrial 
operators the whip hand over producers. It is therefore imperative 
that government be a stakeholder in these contracts, besides industrial 
operators and producers. At European level, Coordination Européenne 
40 FNSEA-FNPL, « Mini paquet lait : une avancée fondamentale pour le secteur lai-
tier, mais aussi pour les autres filières agricoles » (“Mini Milk Package: a fundamental 
advance for the milk and milk products sector, but also for other agriculture sectors”, 
(Press Release, Paris, 10 December 2010.
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Via Campesina (CEVC), of which the Peasants’ Confederation is a 
member, criticised the approach proposed by the GHN in June 2010. 
An individual contract between a producer and a dairy would only be 
useful if there is public control of production and collective negotiation 
of prices on the basis of production costs, including labour.41 At local 
level, in May 2010 the ELB made representations to Basque members 
of the French parliament about the Law on Modernising Agriculture 
which was being prepared at that time, calling for inter-branch 
organizations to be more representative and criticising the project 
to make contractual relations compulsory. This last measure was 
considered to be not enough to counterbalance the power of group 
purchasing organizations42. 
Criticisms of contractual relations which were in 2010 included in 
French law and the Commission proposal, bear upon four points43: a) 
this system does not protect producers, because it does not really define 
the system of fixing milk prices; b) there is no guarantee that producers’ 
milk will continue to be collected by wholesalers beyond a limit of five 
years; c) management by production area is seen as a way to concentrate 
production where costs will be lowest; d) a contractual relations system 
causes the creation of producer organizations (PO) in order to have 
enough weight to stand up to industrial operators, especially when 
managing large volumes: but the legal framework for these POs remains 
undefined: within what legal framework will POs be able to limit their 
production?  Will they able to penalize overproduction? When all is said 
and done, the new organization of the sector is perceived as potentially 
resulting in a concentration of production inside a few milk producing 
areas within Europe, and objective which is in contradiction to CAP 
reform, which recommends diversifying agriculture and maintaining a 
large number of farmers in the territory. The ELB and CP are opposed 
to contractual relations for as long as methods of determining prices 
fail to take account of indexes such as production costs, margins on 
high value-added products (yoghurts, fresh produce) produced by 
41 European Coordination Via Campesina, « Politique laitière de l’UE : le Groupe à 
Haut Niveau condamne les éleveurs européens » (“EU Milk Policy : the High Level 
Group condemns European dairy farmers”), Press release, Brussels, 16 June 2010.
42« Loi de modernisation de l’agriculture. ELB interpelle les députés » (“Agriculture 
Modernisation Law. ELB calls on parliamentarians”), Laborari, 899, 24 June 2010.
43 Laborari, 16 December 2010.
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dairies and wholesalers, and the remuneration of work carried out by 
small farmers.
One of the themes of the current reform is the strengthening of 
intra-branch organizations. The representative nature of inter-branch 
organizations has thus become a central issue. The collective action of 
the Peasants’ Confederation has because of this shifted towards inter-
branch milk organizations nationally. The Peasants’ Confederation 
was calling for all unions to be represented on the College of Inter-
branch Producers’ Organization44 and that decisions be taken there 
by majority vote. On 8 September 2010, the Peasants’ Confederation 
began an occupation lasting five weeks of the Maison du lait, the 
Paris headquarters of the CNIEL. ELB militants took a direct part 
in this action, which was echoed in the Basque Country by the 
symbolic occupation of the DDA45 in Bayonne by ELB militants, in 
order to demand that the ministry become involved by supporting 
the recognition of a plurality of trade unions within the inter-branch 
organizations. In Paris, Peasants’ Confederation activists, several of 
whom were close to bankruptcy, began a hunger strike. 
APLI and the European Milk Board (EMB)
For its part the EMB was critical of the GHN report and the European 
Commission proposal of December 2010, at the same time emphasizing 
the positive achievements in the areas of legal consolidation of producer 
organizations and labelling of milk products46. While sharing the 
view that milk producers are in a poor negotiating position, the EMB 
nevertheless judges that the measures proposed by the Commission do 
not resolve the problem. Criticisms bear in particular on the following 
points: 
- Level of pooling: “In principle, the EMB welcomes the 
European Commission’s proposal to strengthen the milk 
producers’ market position through greater scope for pooling. 
But this must amount to an effective increase in the scope for 
pooling. The level proposed by the European Commission of 
44 Collège producteurs des interprofessions
45 Departmental Direction of Agriculture (state administration).
46 European Milk Board, “High Level Group of Experts on Milk Fails to Deliver”, Brus-
sels, 16 June 2010.
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3,5 per cent of the EU milk volume fails to recognize the state 
of affairs in the market and would result in little improvement 
in real terms (…) the proposal to limit pooling per major 
producer country to 33% also ignores the situation in the dairy 
sector, where for instance in Denmark or the Netherlands one 
single dairy in each already has a larger market share”
- Intensifying exchanges in the added value change: “The milk 
producers in Europe support this idea. In future, the milk 
policy must consider the interests of society as a whole and 
also be compatible with the aims of the CAP. That is why the 
EMB backs the establishment of a Monitoring Agency, which 
besides constantly and promptly charting price, cost, volume 
and market developments also pursues the aim of sustainable 
milk production in every region of Europe. The agency 
would stipulate a target price bracket based on production 
cost calculations, and in turn it would have to be taken as the 
yardstick for volumes to be produced (…)”
- Contracts that can be introduced as binding for member-
states: “Experience shows that contracts between unequal 
negotiating partners put the weaker contracting party at a 
continued disadvantage rather than an equal footing. As 
concentration is prevalent on the dairy sector, the terms and 
conditions of contracts are also dictated by the dairies as the 
strongest market partner. (…) EU states will hardly decide to 
make contracts between dairies and milk producers obligatory. 
The milk market does not end at national borders (…) (…)”47 
In France, the APLI accompanied criticism of contractual relation 
with reiterated criticism of the inter-branch organization . Echoing the 
EMB’s European initiative, the APLI proposed promoting a parallel 
Office du lait (Milk Board). In December 2009, the APLI set itself a 
minimum objective of 35% of milk collected in France, or nearly 700 
billion litres, in order to provide an alternative to the inter-branch 
47 “(…) And the statement of exempting co-operatives from the obligation to sign 
contracts cannot be justified. The German Cartel Office has clearly shown that it is 
precisely in co-operatives that upside down pricing takes place, i.e. the producer is 
paid what is left over depending on turnover in the sales market (…)” (European Milk 
Board, “The Commission’s Proposals Cannot Prevent Another Milk Crisis”, Press Re-
lease, Brussels, 09.12.2010).
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organization.48 The association also advocates the Canadian model 
of managing production levels, which would enable adjustment of 
production to market demand. In May 2010, at Angers, the APLI 
officially registered the constitution of a national Office du lait, where 
minority unions, consumers and councillors and other publicly-elected 
officials would be represented. According to the APLI, in May 2010 
the project had already collected nearly 12,000 promises to become a 
member (out of 83,000 producers of milk within France), representing 
around 4 billion litres of milk or 20% of national production49. There 
was still however the challenge of convincing industrial operators and 
overcoming the opposition of the majority union. The APLI aimed 
to turn to its own account the incentive in the Law for Modernising 
Agriculture for producers to group together by developing its own 
Office, compounded by producers, industrials, wholesalers, consumers 
and public authorities. In early 2011, France Milk Board emerged 
within the Office as a new producers’ organization (PO). Promoted 
first by the national APLI and by OPL, France Milk Board was joined 
by Confédération paysanne (CP) in May 2011. This new PO aimed to 
elaborate a standard contract based on the control of volumes, on real 
production costs and on the economic realities of the farms. In June 
2011, one hundred producers from CP, APLI and OPL demonstrated 
jointly in Caen in order to ask for a collective negotiation of milk price 
with industrials, in order to avoid individual negotiations between 
isolated farmers and dairies.
In the end, in terms of European collective action, unions and 
associations provide instances here of two Europeanization strategies, 
one “top-down” and the other “bottom-up” (Monforte, 2010). Top-
down Europeanization is constructed through interaction. It results 
both from the desire of non-institutional actors to influence the 
48 The APLI and OPL were to support the CNIEL occupation by the Peasants’ Confe-
deration. For its part the APLI launched in Autumn 2010 a legal action to recover the 
“Compulsory Voluntary Contributions” paid by farmers to the milk products inter-
branch.
49« L’APLI dépose les statuts de l’Office national du lait » (“The APLI registers the 
Constitution of the Office national du lait”), La France agricole, 7 May 2010. In No-
vember 2010, the APLI thought it could count on promises for 15 million litres in the 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques (out of the 250 million collected each year) (« L’APLI déplore le 
‘manque de lisibilité’/The APLI deplores the ‘lack of transparency’ », La République des 
Pyrénées, 5 November 2010).
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decision-making and support process of European institutions (in 
the form of various incentives to construct a collective Europeanized 
form of action) This mode of Europeanization essentially involves 
internalization and supranationalization. Groups which prioritize top-
down Europeanization will go for pro-active collective action which 
takes effect upstream of the decision-making process or accompanying 
implementation of measures. In this case, the FNPL took advantage of 
the strength of its position in relation to the national government and 
COPA-COGECA to make its weight felt on the European level.
The actions of the Peasants’ Confederation and the EMB, in contrast, 
are instances of bottom-up Europeanization, which is not built up by 
interaction: it is the result of the desire of non-institutional actors to 
construct a Europeanized collective action and European institutions 
do not play an active incentivising role. In this case, the European 
partner of the ALPI was the EMB (with its German leadership), while 
that of the ELB and CP was Coordination européenne Via Campesina. 
Although it received no encouragement from European institutions, 
this mode of collective action was not however limited to protest 
activities. These organizations lodged proposals with the Commission 
and with the Parliament, and were consulted by the group of experts in 
2010. However, their impact on decision-making instances remained 
relatively limited.
Territorial Consequences for Unions
The strike carried within it the early signs of a breakdown in the 
power relationship between unions, accompanied by a challenge to the 
monopoly enjoyed by traditional structures of generalist representation 
brought about by the successful organization of sector-related defence 
structures (Roullaud, 2010). The movement seemed to federate 
producers of all persuasions, bypassing the traditional oppositions 
between different unions. The Basque situation inclines us to remain 
prudent about any effect on the make-up of trade union representation. 
It is true that those disappointed by the FDSEA swelled the ranks of 
the APLI. Nevertheless, links between the APLI and OPL-Coordination 
rurale, the main bodies behind the strike call at national level (Purseigle, 
2010), have not been demonstrated here. Coordination rurale continues 
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to have little presence on a Basque territory which is systematically 
covered by ELB and the FDSEA in almost equal measure. The situation 
may perhaps have to be nuanced in the Béarn part of the department, 
where Coordination rurale received the greatest part of the 12% voting 
turnout in the 2007 Chamber of Agriculture elections50. 
Turning to other matters, it is by no means certain that the temporary 
alliance between the ELB and the APLI over the milk strike will lead 
to a lasting coalition. The ELB’s agreement with the APLI over short-
term demands does not mean that there is a perfect identity of views 
between two organizations with different and distinct origins. A 
negative coalition against a majority union is not necessarily a basis for 
an identity of values. Although they agree on the principle of the strike 
and the immediate demands to be made, the ELB and the APLI have not 
necessarily deepened the harmonization of their points of view on price 
setting mechanisms or on key aspects of distributing quotas, which for 
ELB are a long-lasting campaign subject at the level of the département. 
On other themes, identity of points of view is far from being achieved 
by the ELB and APLI, especially on the inheritance of farm holdings. In 
the last analysis, a generalist trade union and a specialized sector-based 
association will not necessarily share the same objectives. We shall 
have to see in the future whether the coalition stabilizes if the APLI 
decides to extend its mobilization to ewes’ milk, a sector where the ELB 
is strongly present at intra-branch organization level, and where sheep 
breeding policy and health issues will not necessarily be subjected to 
analyses which are in concord. 
Besides the trade unions, cooperatives have also learned lessons from 
the crisis. Following the strike, one large collection and processing 
cooperative has planned to draw up charts showing collection 
figures from producers against its industrial needs in terms of cheese 
processing, in order to avoid the creation of surpluses. In the Basque 
Country, managers of cooperatives were making efforts to restore 
confidence with producers:
50 Results in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques (farmers’ college): FDSEA-JA: 55,21%, ELB: 
21,98%; Coordination rurale: 12,1%; Confédération Paysanne Béarn: 12%. The majo-
rity system gave these unions 17, 2, 1 and 1 seat respectively.
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“The strike, when it came to people’s feelings, we had six very 
difficult months for the cooperative. Really, very difficult. We had 
no relationship with the producers. We tried, we organized 15 
meetings at cooperative level. Three in the department, right in 
the middle of the strike. Where people boycotted us. Where people 
came and said to us: you’ve got nothing to say to us, we know what 
you have to say, and they went off again. And we kept on at it, we 
started having meetings again, they told us it was not on. These 
are people we know, these are people who work together, they 
still have to be told what’s happening at the cooperative, outside 
the cooperative, in the milk industry. And little by little dialogue 
started happening again, while the price of milk has still remained 
quite low.”51 
Social consequences
At the territorial level, the strike was the occasion for three things 
to be realized by the milk-producing community. “The first 
danger”, emphasizes this FDSEA official, “is not about the union. It’s 
demoralization. That the guys can’t make a living from their profession 
any more”52. A study by the CNIEL published in 2008 emphasizes 
that at French national level, 35% of dairy farmers (or 48,645) have 
disappeared in 10 years, and that 75% of dairy farmers do not feel 
that they are recognized by the wider public (CNIEL, 2008). Difficult 
economic situations, together with a dependency on regular wages 
brought in by the farmer or his wife or partner, are likely to influence 
the numbers deciding to set up in the profession, although the figure is 
relatively high in the Basque Country. The issue of insecurity is central 
to these worries. In April 2010, at the behest of the APLI in the wake of 
industrial action by 400 producers and their wives at Poitiers, several 
Basque producers jointly submitted applications for income support to 
the farmers’ mutual fund (Mutualité sociale agricole)53. The symbolic 
force of the gesture was twofold: apart from pointing the finger at the 
fall in incomes, the APLI aimed to make the wider public aware the 
farmers aim to live from their earnings and not from handouts or social 
51 Interview with Cooperative Manager, op. cit.
52 FDSEA interview, op. cit.
53 C. Revenu-Jomier, « Des producteurs de lait contraints au RSA » (Milk Producers 
Forced onto Income Support”), Le Journal du Pays Basque, 6 April 2010.
31 Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  [11]
security payments. 
For this local FDSEA official however, although the situation is critical 
it is not without historical precedent:
“I set up business in 1981. In 1984, quotas went down. I should 
have stopped doing milk. I didn’t stop doing milk. In 1984 I had 
a quota of 20 or 30,000. And it was supposed to stay at that level. 
And fortunately there was the union, because I’ve been active 
since I became a farmer, fortunately the union took action. The 
period that we’re going through now is not necessarily harsher 
than what I lived through between 1984 and 1990 with those milk 
quotas. Because at one point we wanted to get rid of milk quotas 
too. Because we had something we liked before that. And now 
people want them. In any case, the mistake we made at the time 
was that we didn’t want to manage them. I don’t know if we could 
have done it, we weren’t given the choice. But if we had managed 
them, perhaps we would have kept them for longer. Perhaps we 
could have done something different with them. But one thing is 
sure, we had to go through some terrible things at that time. The 
Basque Country was being sacrificed. Then one day the quota went 
down. At that time it was historical production levels that were 
supposed to be the reference point. And that was supposed to be it. 
Fortunately we got organized to do something different, references 
and so on came in here, because otherwise milk production around 
here would have disappeared, that’s clear. And at that time we 
weren’t at all specialized. Milk production was very piecemeal. 
And then things changed a lot. For the better or the worse, I don’t 
know. Some say that it was not for the better because there are 
many fewer producers … But a builder today, with many fewer 
workers, builds lots more houses. (…) And production hasn’t gone 
down, quite the opposite, in the Basque Country”.54 
The strike caused many producers, whether strikers or not, to become 
aware of a second point, that of the reality of the sector as a whole, 
of price-setting mechanisms and the intertwining of markets and 
decision-making levels, in particular the European level. Until then, 
the horizon of a large number of producers did not go beyond relations 
54 FDSEA interview, op. cit.
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with the industrial operator or the milk-collecting cooperative. For 
APLI officials, broadly speaking: “(interview 1): up until now, you had 
the impression that they were doing you a favour when they took your 
milk. It’s very nice of him to take our milk.” (...) (interview 2): “We had 
got to the point where you thought: ‘who are you giving the milk to?” It 
wasn’t ‘who are you selling it to? It was ‘who are you giving it to?’”. The 
strike, in this sense, occasioned a realization of the sector as a whole as 
the ELB official expresses it:
“This strike, I’ll say it today after the strike, I’m convinced of this, 
this strike showed us that we were not only producers but sellers. 
This came up quite often in our conversation with each other. We 
are the sellers of what we produce. I have never heard so much 
of this kind of talk over the last few years. (...) We are used to 
negotiating the price of our animals. With the dealer. A calf, a 
lamb, a ewe. We negotiate the price. Thirty years ago somebody 
somewhere was setting the price of milk, the CNIEL and so on, we 
weren’t too sure, they were our representatives...We were happy to 
leave that to others. This time, for many of us, it was ‘it’s our milk, 
it’s the milk that we produce. Can’t we sell it ourselves?”55 
A third set of issues concerns the link between type of agriculture, the 
organization of work and the effects induced by modes of regulation. 
For this manager of a cooperative, the quota system reinforced a certain 
type of individualism, especially in the Basque Country, a territory 
marked by a strong attachment to small family holdings:
“In France we went for the family type. Which has to change, 
because we did not go for the best option. If you say dairy farming 
you’re saying 365 days a year. And if you want to organize the work, 
the business has to be big enough for there to be enough employees 
and enough farmers for them to be able to cover for each other. This 
is not what was done. When quotas were set up, we dug in on the 
farm, and even more so the Basque Country, because we’re more 
attached to it than people elsewhere are, and each farmer tried to 
have extra quotas of course, to make a living. So in terms of work 
organization, of life as a small farmer or peasant and a life outside 
55 ELB interview, op. cit. Translated from Basque.
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work as a small farmer or peasant, it was a catastrophe. And today 
we are paying a heavy price for that kind of thinking because when 
young people look at it, they have seen their parents working and 
they say ‘this is not what I’m looking for. I’m ready to work, but if 
I know I’m going to work nine or ten hours, (…) have some time 
free, etc.”56 
The low level of development of joint venture farming may have made 
the situation more difficult for a large number of farmers. While 
emphasizing the recent development of associative forms of farming, 
including those outside family frameworks, the APLI also emphasizes 
the strong influence of “familial individualism”:
“In the Basque Country there has been an enormous amount of 
mutual support, but making something official out of this is not 
on. It’s mind your own business. At the same time, the family farm 
is the reference point for the family. If you start to lend it to your 
neighbour, you lose a bit of…It’s true that today there are still 
places where they wonder ‘What’s going to become of the family 
farm? Are they keeping their family identity, relating to the place, 
the farm itself?’ In agriculture, the Basque Country family farm 
is still the basis of the family. So going into association with your 
neighbour…There are places where they do everything together, 
except that afterwards each has his own accounts”.57 
CONCLUSION
The 2009 milk strike marked a dual Europeanization of political 
regulation and industrial action within the milk and milk products 
sector. Observation of industrial action in the Basque territory enables 
a response to the three questions posed by a microscopic analysis of 
Europeanization. In this case, construction of European “meaning” is 
carried out in conditions of competition by local professional actors 
who are divided by divergent visions of the sector and the territory. 
The choice of a radical, innovative action repertoire – the milk strike 
56 Interview, milk-cooperative manager, op. cit.
57 APLI interview, op. cit.
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– has enabled a sectoral issue to be mediatised and transformed into a 
territorial problem, by spotlighting the sector’s European dimension. 
Finally, behind the shared discourse of a remote and technocratic 
vision of Europe, hide much subtler strategies on the part of unionized 
and association-based actors, who are working “top-down” or “bottom-
up” in a profound way and with varying success to achieve access to 
European decision-making.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
APLI : Association des producteurs de lait indépendants
ATLA : Association de la Transformation laitière française
CAP : Common Agricultural Policy
CEPE : Coordination européenne Via Campesina
CLPB : Coopérative laitière du Pays Basque
CNIEL : Centre National Interprofessionnel de l’Economie Laitière
CP : Confédération paysanne
COAG: Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y de 
Ganaderos
COPA-COGECA : Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations - General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives
DDA : Direction départementale de l’agriculture
DGCCRF : Direction générale de la concurrence et de la répression des 
fraudes
EHNE : Euskal Herriko Nekezarien Elkartea (syndicat agricole basque 
espagnol)
ELB : Euskal Herriko Laborarien batasuna : Union des paysans du Pays 
basque
EMB : European Milk Board
FDSEA : Fédération départementale des syndicats d’exploitants 
agricoles
FNCL : Fédération Nationale des Coopératives Laitières
FNIL : Fédération Nationale des Industries Laitières
FNPL : Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Lait
FNSEA : Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles
GAEC : Groupement agricole d’exploitation en commun
GHN : Groupe d’experts de haut niveau
JA 64 : Jeunes Agriculteurs – Pyrénées-Atlantiques
OPL : Organisation des producteurs de lait (Coordination rurale)
SPOT (marché) : marché au comptant portant sur les devises, les taux 
ou les matières premières
